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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND THE
HOMOSEXUAL
There exists today an ever-increasing concern regarding govern-
mental intrusion into the private lives of American citizens. This has
recently been evidenced in a number of judicial determinations wherein
the courts have taken a restrictive view of governmental interference
vis--vis such moral issues as contraception, pornography and abortion.1
These decisions have manifested a discernible trend away from regula-
tion of those areas of an individual's life falling within the category of
"morality." The most recent developments along these lines appear to
extend the scope of this protection to homosexuals.
Until recently, in addition to the criminal sanctions prescribed for
private, consensual homosexual acts, 2 there has been a governmentally
imposed civil censure of those whose conduct, while short of that crim-
inally proscribed, transcends the boundaries of commonly accepted
sexual mores. One result of this has been the traditional exclusion of
homosexuals from government employment.3 Now, as modern concepts
of due process expand, such exclusionary policies are being attacked as
unduly harsh, unreasonably based, and, therefore, violative of the fifth
and fourteenth amendment due process clauses.
In Norton v. Macy,4 the District of Columbia Circuit delimited the
grounds upon which the Civil Service Commission may dismiss a homo-
sexual employee by narrowly interpreting the congressional provision
that no civil servant may be discharged except for "such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service."" Subsequently, in Morrison v.
State Board of Education,6 the California Supreme Court refused to
uphold the dismissal of a homosexual teacher under a statute providing
for removal on the basis of "immoral conduct." The Morrison court,
relying extensively on Norton, held that the requirements of due process
1 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Babbitz v. McCann, 312 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
2 Forty-nine of the fifty states proscribe private, consensual homosexual activities.
Illinois, the exception, allows such conduct between adults. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11
(1963). Many states express their moral indignation through statutory terminology such
as "lascivious act," "unnatural and detestable crime," and "sexual perversion." See Project,
The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and
Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.LA.L. REv. 643, 658-59 & n.20 1966).
3 See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82
HARv. L. Rxv. 1738 (1969).
4417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
55 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (Supp. I1 1965-1967).
6 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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of law could not be satisfied unless the school board related its determi-
nation of immorality to the plaintiff's unfitness to teach. More recently,
in McConnell v. Anderson, the United States District Court for Minne-
sota reached a similar determination regarding a state university's fail-
ure to hire an otherwise qualified librarian who publicly proclaimed
his sexual preference for males. Abandoning the concept that public
employment is a privilege rather than a constitutionally protected right,
the federal district court found that the employing university's ruling
of ineligibility was violative of the due process clause since it was predi-
cated upon the plaintiff's unrelated private behavior rather than on
any inability to successfully perform the duties of a librarian. These
recent decisions indicate an apparent reversal in government policy
towards homosexuals; and it is the scope of that reversal with which
this comment will deal.
Prior to Norton, the American judiciary evidenced little concern
for the substantive bases underlying the exclusion of homosexuals from
governmental employ. Unquestioned government policy presumed the
validity of such dismissals as being necessary for the promotion of gen-
eral agency efficiency. The assumption that the presence of homosexuals
impaired efficiency per se was so firmly embedded in the opinion of the
District of Columbia Circuit in Dew v. Halaby,s that the majority dis-
posed of a contrary argument by means of a footnote.9 Similarly, the
dissent chose to ignore the efficiency issue and based its disagreement
on the finding that although Dew might have had sexual relationships
with other men previously, he was not, at the time of discharge, a homo-
sexual.' 0 The circuit court thus deemed "the crucial question"" to be
whether removal could be properly based on the plaintiff's pre-employ-
ment conduct, despite the fact that the appellant introduced evidence
allegedly proving that his admitted homosexual acts were unrelated
to his competence. The issue was reduced to one of procedure, and the
Civil Service Commission was not called upon to defend the broader
policy under which the plaintiff had been dismissed. The Commission's
determination of unfitness was thereby upheld despite its insistence
that Dew's capability at the time of dismissal was "irrelevant," and its
unvarnished admission that it had no evidence "whatsoever" that he
was incompetent.'1 However, the agency's awareness of the difficulties
that might be encountered in defending its policy toward homosexuals
7- F. Supp. - (D. Minn. 1970).
8 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Old. at 587 n.10.
10 Id. at 591 (dissenting opinion).
3.1Id. at 585.
2id. at 591 n.11 (dissenting opinion),
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was made manifest upon the granting of certiorari by the Supreme
Court. At this juncture the Commission chose to reinstate Dew with
back pay in lieu of responding on the merits of the issue.
In Anonymous v. Macy,13 the Fifth Circuit was presented with an
opportunity to unequivocally review the merits of the Civil Service
Commission's exclusionary policy towards homosexuals. The plaintiff,
a postal worker discharged for homosexual activities, did not deny the
allegations, but, instead, argued that such acts were committed in pri-
vate during nonworking hours, that they had no effect on the efficiency
of the service, and that they could not therefore be proper grounds for
his dismissal. In a brief per curiam opinion, the court, relying on Har-
gett v. Summerfield,14 refused to consider the above contentions, con-
cluding that a review of a Civil Service determination of unfitness on
the merits was beyond the scope of its authority. As in Dew, the issue
was thus reduced to one of procedure. The court found that the pro-
cedural defect, i.e., the Government's failure to inform the appellant
of an affidavit used against him at the initial hearing, had been waived.
While the Fifth Circuit was admittedly concerned with protecting the
discharged employee's procedural rights, it found it unnecessary to de-
termine whether there was a rational relationship between the facts as
found by the Commission and the action allegedly taken on the basis
of those facts.
Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit first rec-
ognized the possible need for an examination of the Civil Service Com-
mission's exclusionary policies in the 1965 decision of Scott v. Macy.'r
In that case, a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the appellant's dismissal
from federal employment for homosexual activities because the Com-
mission had failed to specify the particular acts found immoral. Relying
on this procedural defect, Judge McGowan, concurring, was able to
avoid the Chief Judge's dictum that the appellant's conduct must be
shown to have a detrimental effect upon efficiency. 16 He did, however,
concede that this issue might have arisen if Scott had been given proper
notice of the acts relied upon.Y1
13 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1968).
14 "So long as there is substantial compliance with applicable procedures and stat-
utes. . . .administrative determination[s are] not reviewable as to the wisdom or good
judgment of the department head in exercising his discretion." Id. at 318 n.1, quoting 243
F.2d 29 (1957).
15 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
16 Chief Judge Bazelon would require not only the specifics of the acts alleged, but
also a statement as to how the conduct alleged was related to the appellants "occupational
competence or fitness." Id. at 185.
17 Id. at 186. In a strong dissent, Judge Burger, now Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, objected not only to the reversal, but also to the Chief Judge's
dictum concerning the showing of a relationship between conduct and efficiency. Relying
19701
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The same two parties again appeared before the District of Colum-
bia Circuit after the Civil Service Commission had purportedly cor-
rected the procedural defects upon which the earlier decision had been
disposed.18 Subsequent to the first adjudication, the Commission had
confronted Scott with specific allegations of homosexual activity, and
then challenged him to deny that he had ever engaged in homosexual
acts. The appellant denied all specific charges and asserted that the
Commission had no right to ask the latter question because it had no
bearing upon his fitness to perform work and, therefore, constituted an
invasion of his right to privacy. The agency deemed the question per-
tinent to a determination of fitness, and rated him ineligible for em-
ployment due to his "refusal to furnish testimony" as provided by the
Code of Federal Regulations.19 Despite Scott's urgings that the grava-
men of his disqualification was his reputedly immoral conduct, and
contrary to its own prior ratiocination, the Commission abdicated its
position and alleged instead that its determination was exclusively based
upon the appellant's failure to testify. The court, recognizing the fa-
tuity of this argument, reversed the disqualification based on the Gov-
ernment's failure to inform Scott of an unambiguous predicate for such
agency action. Perhaps of greatest significance in this case was the Com-
mission's perseverance in its efforts to keep the broader issue, i.e., its
policy toward homosexuals, beyond the reach of the judiciary. This in-
tent on the part of the Commission was again made clear by its subse-
quent action when, as in Dew, the agency found the appellant suitable
for employment rather than face the merits of the issue in further liti-
gation.20
The significant inquiries raised in Scott, i.e., whether governmental
scrutiny of private conduct is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy, and whether the exclusion of homosexuals from government
service promotes efficiency, were not adjudicated until the decision of
Norton v. Macy.21
The controversy in Norton arose when the appellant, a budget
analyst in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
on Dew, Judge Burger felt the Commission was acting within the discretionary powers
delegated by Congress. Moreover, he contended, "precedent, contemporary standards, and
common sense require rejection of [Scott's] substantive argument." Id. at 190 (dissenting
opinion).
18 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
19 "[T]he Commission may deny an applicant examination, deny an eligible appoint-
ment, and instruct an agency to remove an appointee for any of the following reasons ...
(d) Refusal to furnish testimony as required by § 5.3 of this chapter.... 5 C.F.R.
§ 731.201(d) (1968).
20 Note, supra note 3, at 1748.
21417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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was arrested, ostensibly for a traffic violation, by two officers of the
Washington Morals Squad. A passenger in Norton's car told the au-
thorities that the appellant had "felt his leg" and that "it would take
an idiot not to be able to figure that he [appellant] wanted to have
sex . . . on me.122 Immediately subsequent to police investigations,
which lasted almost twenty-four hours, and which his supervising em-
ployer had witnessed incognito, Norton allegedly conceded that he had
engaged in mutual masturbation with other males and that he some-
times experienced homosexual desires while drinking. As a result, he
was discharged from his position for "immoral, indecent, and disgrace-
ful conduct" and for having "traits of character and personality which
render him.., unsuitable for further Government employment.."23 In
a reversal of previous policy, the District of Columbia Circuit chose
to assume arguendo that the Commission's factual findings were true
and that the questionable procedural tactics utilized were satisfactory.
The court thus concerned itself with the merits, i.e., whether Norton's
dismissal would promote service efficiency as required by Congress.
Chief Judge Bazelon promptly rejected the Fifth Circuit's asser-
tion that an administrative agency's estimation of an employee's quali-
fications is beyond judicial scrutiny. The Chief Judge, writing for the
majority, was of the opinion that "[t]he Government's obligation to
accord due process sets at least minimal substantive limits on ... [the
Civil Service Commission's] prerogative to dismiss its employees .... -24
The administrative agency's admittedly wide discretion in this area, he
said, did not obviate the need to show an "adequate rational cause"
for its action. Moreover, these limitations were deemed greater where
the individual's prospects for private employ would be severely cur-
tailed as a result of the stigma attached to government dismissal; the
court likened a federal rating of unsuitability to "an official defama-
tion of character."25
The court then turned to the Commission's hypothesis that the
need to establish an adequate rational cause for dismissal could be
neutralized by merely labeling an employee's conduct as immoral. In
refuting this tenet, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that "[a]
pronouncement of 'immorality' tends to discourage careful analysis
because it unavoidably connotes.., universal standards of rectitude."20
The court felt that it was not within the province of the Commission
221d. at 1162-63.
23 Id. at 1163.
24 Id. at 1164.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1165.
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"to make or enforce absolute moral judgments. '27 Moreover, even
assuming that such a determination could be accurately made, predi-
cated on conventional societal standards, the imposition of such stan-
dards on the private lives of federal employees, the Circuit Court
maintained, "is at war with elementary concepts of liberty, privacy and
diversity." 28 Thus, it was resolved that Norton could not be dismissed
on the basis of "immoral conduct" unless there could be shown an
ascertainable relationship between what he had done or might be dis-
posed to do and the efficiency of the service.
The court next distinguished Norton from its earlier holding in
Dew v. Halaby on the somewhat tenuous grounds that the latter case
"rested on the special demands of a position entailing continuing re-
sponsibility for many lives." 29 Since no proof was offered in Dew con-
cerning service efficiency, and since the Commission had in fact ad-
mitted that its dismissal therein was not in any way related to Dew's
capability, a distinction predicated on Dew's position or responsibility
seems inconsistent with the efficiency standard promulgated in Norton.
The Chief Judge did note, however, that Dew had not been finally
adjudicated because Dew was reinstated shortly after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In any event, the court emphasized that
Norton was not in contact with the public and that his fellow em-
ployees were unaware of his reputedly immoral behavior. Moreover,
the NASA official who fired him testified that Norton was a competent
employee and expressed a desire to help him "if there was anyway
around this kind of problem." 80 The official admitted that the dis-
missal was based on the Commission's policy of excluding homosexual
workers and did not reflect the agency's concern with the appellant's
job performance or his affect on service efficiency.
The Commission's admitted reason for discharging Norton was
based on the "nebulous" theory that although the appellant's con-
tinued employ would not directly lead to a decrease in efficiency, this
result would occur indirectly because his presence would eventually
embarrass the agency and lead to bad relations with the public. Re-
fusing to accede to this reasoning, the court required the showing of
"some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an em-
ployee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the
service." 31 Finding the possibility of embarrassment unsubstantiated,
27 Id.
28Id.
29 Id. at 1166.
8o Id. at 1166-67.
8lid. at 1167.
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and the appellant's private behavior discreet, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that his dismissal was an arbitrary governmental action,
repugnant to the requirements of due process, and that he was there-
fore unlawfully discharged.
The Norton court specifically noted that its holding did not pre-
clude the possible discharge of homosexuals from government employ,
but rather, required that such action rest on some "ascertainable
deleterious effect" upon service efficiency. Thus, the potential vulner-
ability of a homosexual privy to classified information to blackmail, or
the notorious and flagrant displays of unorthodox sexual behavior,
might, in a given situation, be valid grounds for a homosexual's dis-
missal. Moreover, if agency embarrassment were substantiated, it was
conceded that this might also be cause for removal; but such cause
must relate to "some more concrete injury to the service than a general
tarnishing of an agency's antiseptic public image."32
Before a meaningful analysis of the Norton decision can be at-
tempted, it is necessary to dispense with the dissent's concern that the
court had violated agency discretion in reaching its determination.
Placing heavy reliance on Hargett v. Summerfield, which the majority
allegedly distinguished in its discussion of the Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Anonymous v. Macy, the dissent, per Judge Tamm, concluded that
the theory that homosexual conduct does not relate to efficiency is un-
realistic, and that the reversal of the agency's dismissal of a homo-
sexual was an abrogation of agency discretion.
Preliminarily, it must be reiterated that the Norton court found
that the Commission's action was not improper per se, but rather it
was improper because it was unsubstantiated. It is not only the privi-
lege, but the duty of the courts to see that administrative action,
whether or not the court agrees with the final determination, has a
substantial basis in fact.33 Since the Civil Service Commission's own
spokesman based his dismissal of Norton on mere custom, admitting
that he was not himself adverse to the appellant's continued employ-
ment, the Commission's determination that the removal would pro-
mote efficiency seems not only to be devoid of any substantial basis in
fact, but also in contradiction of its own findings. The "embarrassment
theory" was likewise unrelated to any evidence suggestive of a dele-
terious effect upon efficacy. Indeed, the Chief Judge specifically noted
32 Id. at 1168.
33 See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Yakov v. Board
of Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); Board of Educ. v.
Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953); Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d
147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (3d Dist. 1962).
1970]
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that although the theory might be logically supportable in the abstract,
neither the public nor Norton's fellow employees were aware of his
alleged homosexual behavior. The appellant's dismissal was not re-
versed because the court disagreed with the Commission's theory, or
because the majority chose to replace the agency's hypothesis with one
of its own, but because "the record before... [the court did] not sug-
gest any reasonable connection between the evidence against [the ap-
pellant] and the efficiency of the service." 84
The rationale underlying the court's strict interpretation of the
efficiency standard in Norton was based largely on its awareness of the
untoward difficulties thrust upon homosexual workers as a result of
dismissal by the Government. The majority reasoned that the interests
of the Civil Service in excluding these people must be weighed against
the burdens created by such action. Notwithstanding the dissent's
belief that the Commission had a valid interest in protecting govern-
mental agencies from the possibilities of "public reproach and private
extortion,"3 5 Judge Bazelon correctly reasoned that the agency's inter-
ests must be evaluated not in the abstract, but in cognizance of the
rights of the individual.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as re-
quiring such a balancing of interests. In Lawton v. Steele, 6 the Court
stated that the means employed to effectuate an existent governmental
purpose must be "reasonably necessary for [its] accomplishment ...
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."37 That the interests of
the states are delimited by resultant burdens imposed on, and respect
for the individual, is further manifested by Supreme Court standards
for substantive due process such as "hardship so acute and shocking
that our policy will not endure it"38 and "protection of ultimate
decency in a civilized society."3 9 Similarly, the guarantees of due
process were expressed by Justice Frankfurter in 1960, as follows:
[Government action] must be judged in the light of reason drawn
from the considerations of fairness that reflect our traditions of le-
gal and political thought, duly related to the public interest Con-
gress sought to meet... as against the hazards or hardships to the
individual .... 40
34417 F.2d at 1162.
35 Id. at 1169 (dissenting opinion).
86 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
87 Id. at 137.
88 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
39 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947).
40 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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In addition to the hardships imposed upon a discharged homo-
sexual worker, the Norton court noted that the Commission's rationale
would necessitate government regulation of the private behavior of
its employees - thus traversing "that ill-defined area of privacy which
is increasingly if indistinctly recognized as a foundation of several
specific constitutional protections." 41 The opinion of Mr. Justice Jack-
son in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette42 presaged
the more stringent standard now being imposed where government
action infringes on personal liberties:
The right of a state to regulate, for example, a public utility
may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power
to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
"rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press,
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect.4 3
More recently, in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 4 the Court, per Justice
Douglas, reasserted this doctrine on the basis of the first amendment,
stating that "[t]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion ... .,"45 Regarding Connecti-
cut's proscription of the use of contraceptives, the Court ruled that
[s]uch a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often
applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedom."46
In the same decision, Justice Goldberg's concurrence expressed the
view that the fourteenth amendment "embraces the right of... privacy
though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution."47
He stated further:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where funda-
mental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged
... simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational
relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
41417 F.2d at 1164.
42319 US. 624 (1943).
43 Id. at 639.
44381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45 Id. at 483.
46 Id. at 485, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
47 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
1970j
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may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling." The law must be shown "necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a significant state
policy."4s
Since Griswold concerned the right to marital privacy, it must be
made clear that the Norton decision, while relying on a theory simi-
larly based on fundamental personal liberties, did not analogize any
supposed right to participate in homosexual activities to the sacro-
sanctness inherent in marriage. While such an analogy might be
drawn,49 the Norton analogy is rather: that as the Government's right
to regulate sexual behavior pales at the connubial bed, its prerogatives
in setting employment standards wane where the enforcement of such
standards necessitates the regulation of unrelated private behavior.
Thus, the plaintiff's right to privacy, when viewed in conjunction with
the damage to his future prospects for private employ, was said to
magnify "[t]he Government's obligation to accord due process." 50
That the protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment
should be carefully considered where the individual's reputation and
ability to effectively pursue his vocation are threatened is not without
precedent. In Birnbaum v. Trussel,51 the Second Circuit employed
this reasoning in reversing the expulsion of a physician from a munici-
pal hospital for alleged bigotry towards Negroes. There, the court
took specific cognizance of the trend to consider the dismissal as bear-
ing upon the individual's opportunity for employment thereafter, and
declared that
[w]henever there is a substantial interest, other than employment
by the state, involved in the discharge of a public employee, he can
be removed neither on arbitrary grounds nor without a procedure
calculated to determine whether legitimate grounds do exist.52
The court concluded that the dismissal threatened the vital inter-
48 Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
49 In 1969, the United States Supreme Court established new guidelines for the cen-
sorship of obscene matter which bear significantly upon the Government's right to regulate
private consensual behavior in general. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
In Stanley the Court found that the mere categorization of matter as obscene was
"insufficient justification for [an] invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 565. These guarantees, said the Court, are "not con-
fined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by the majority." Id. at
566, citing Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959). The absence
of any danger to society as a result of private possession of obscene matter was carefully
weighed by the Court in reaching its determination. Id. at 560-68.
5o 417 F.2d at 1164.
51371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
52 Id. at 678.
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ests of the appellant, i.e., his ability to pursue his career, and that his
discharge was in contravention of the protections established to pre-
vent injury by arbitrary governmental action.53
Since Norton, the position of the homosexual vis-h-vis government
employment has gained additional support from the California deci-
sion of Morrison v. State Board of Education.5 4
Immediately subsequent to the discovery of Marc Morrison's ad-
mitted participation in a private, noncriminal homosexual relation-
ship, he resigned from his position as a teacher for the Lowell Joint
School District of Los Angeles County. He had been previously granted
a general secondary life diploma, had earned certification granting
him the right to teach exceptional children, and had subsequently per-
formed satisfactorily as a teacher. Thereafter, the board of education
revoked his tenure pursuant to section 13202 of the California Educa-
tion Code, 5 which authorizes revocation for immoral conduct, unpro-
fessional conduct, and acts involving moral turpitude.56 Morrison's
homosexual conduct was found to be a valid cause for revocation
within the purview of this statute. Upon affirmation of the board's
decision by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the plaintiff
appealed to the California Supreme Court.
In reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court, per Justice Tobriner, concluded that section 13202 authorizes
revocation only for conduct indicating "unfitness to teach," and that
no evidence produced by the board of education indicated such unfit-
ness on the part of Morrison.57 Absent evidence establishing a relation-
ship between the plaintiff's questioned private conduct and his ability
to perform as a teacher, the revocation of his life diplomas could not
be upheld. Thus, although section 13202 of the education code does
not specify that the immoral conduct must bear a relationship to the
employee's performance on the job, such an interpretation was deemed
necessary to uphold the constitutionality of the statute. The court
maintained that without this interpretation the statute would be so
53 Id. at 678 n.13.
54 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
55 CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13202 (West 1960) provides that "[t]he State Board of Education
shall revoke or suspend for immoral or unprofessional conduct. . . . or for any cause
which would have warranted the denial of an application for a certification document,
... life diplomas, documents, or credentials issued pursuant to this code." Id. § 13129(e)
warrants denial of an application for such documents if the applicant has engaged in
conduct involving moral turpitude.
56It should be noted that these sections do not deal with criminal homosexual
activity. Such would result in automatic dismissal upon conviction under CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 12912, 13206, 13207.
57 1 Cal. 3d at 236, 461 P. 2d at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
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broad in scope that it would fall for arbitrariness under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Tobriner noted that the uncertainty of phrases such as
"unprofessional" or "immoral" conduct and "moral turpitude" have
been condemned by courts and commentators, and that these expres-
sions are used in such a wide variety of contexts that they become
meaningless unless related to specific circumstances. While recognizing
existing case law in support of the state's right to regulate conditions
of government service pursuant to statutes utilizing such terms, the
court distinguished those cases on the ground that they dealt with
conduct having a discernibly negative effect on the employee's com-
petence. Therefore, upon the court's findings that the board of educa-
tion "failed to show that [Morrison's] conduct in any manner affected
his performance as a teacher," and in reliance on Norton, the decision
was reversed.
The majority's liberality is counterpoised by the provincialism
of Justice Sullivan's dissent, which typifies much of the reasoning
underlying the traditionally disdainful attitude towards homosexuals
on the part of the government and the general public alike. Justice
Sullivan disagreed with the majority view that the terms immoral and
unprofessional would become arbitrary unless the questioned conduct
was specifically related to the plaintiff's unfitness to teach. In support
of his position, cases were cited defining immorality as "shameless con-
duct showing moral indifference to the opinions of respectable mem-
bers of the community" and as acts of "baseness, vileness, or depravity
.. . contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man." So reprehensible were Morrison's acts, in the
opinion of Justice Sullivan, that no authority or argument was con-
sidered necessary to substantiate the inference that they were encom-
passed by these definitions. Thus, he specifically opposed the Norton
view that incompetence cannot be ipso facto imputed from immorality.
Beyond this, Justice Sullivan contended that, even assuming the
majority's position arguendo, the decision of the court of appeals
should nevertheless have been upheld. This determination was based
upon the assumption that Morrison stood in loco parentis vis-A-vis his
pupils, and on the statutory provision requiring all teachers to impress
the principles of morality upon their students.58 He maintained that
the plaintiff was especially dangerous to the impressionable minds of
his pupils because of his failure to admit the immorality of his conduct.
58 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13556.5 (West 1960) requires all teachers to "endeavor to impress
upon the minds of the pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, (and] patriotism."
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In a similar fashion, the learned Justice refused to adhere to that
part of the court's opinion distinguishing the instant case from that of
Sarac v. State Board of Education.9 Although recognizing that Sarac,
unlike the instant situation, involved homosexual behavior committed
on a beach in full view of the public, followed by a criminal arrest,
he stated that the fact that Morrison's acts were of a "clandestine
[nature] ... did not render them any the less homosexual acts.... It
would be fatuous to assume," he said, "that such acts became repre-
hensible only if committed in public."60 Thus, Justice Sullivan con-
cluded that the plaintiff's conduct was immoral within the meaning of
section 13202 of the education code, and that by reason of the intrinsic
immorality of his behavior, Morrison had demonstrated his unfitness
to teach.
By resisting the temptation to assume total cognizance of society's
moral fiber, the Morrison court properly refused to rule on whether or
not homosexuality is immoral per se. The state's obligation to accord
due process to all individuals regardless of "the opinions of respectable
members of the community," was thereby correctly upheld. As noted
in Norton,61 such opinions are of Lilliputian authority when weighed
against the constitutional protections of privacy and due process of
law. In a time during which attitudes towards sexual behavior are in a
state of. considerable flux, and in recognition of the fact that Morrison's
behavior was, in the worst view, merely a violation of "moral" law,
his dismissal was an arbitrary denial of his rights as an individual and
therefore repugnant to the very essence of due process. 62
Justice Sullivan's contention that homosexuality can be accurately
categorized within the prevailing societal view of immoral conduct does
not mitigate the capriciousness of a dismissal which lacks adequate
rational cause. His allegation that a homosexual is incapable of im-
pressing the principles of morality "upon the minds of his pupils" is
palpably unjustifiable. Morrison had successfully performed his duties
as a teacher both before and after the discovery of his homosexual
activities. No evidence was presented indicating his failure, or the possi-
bility of his future failure, to impress moral principles upon his stu-
dents. Moreover, his public conduct apparently evinced no reason to
even suspect the unconventional nature of his private sexual behavior,
59 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
60 1 Cal. 3d 214, 244, 461 P.2d 375, 898, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 198 (1969).
61 See notes 39-56 and accompanying text supra.
62 The essential aspect of due process of law has been held to be "the protection of
the individual against arbitrary [state] action." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
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and, if not for the fortuitous discovery of the latter,68 and the subse-
quent action taken by the board of education, his private life would
not have been subjected to public scrutiny. Similarly, the inference that
homosexuals are basically of low moral character is an empirically
unsupportable assumption. Sigmund Freud considered them to be "men
and women who otherwise have reached an irreproachably high stan-
dard of mental growth and development, intellectually and ethi-
cally."6
4
While the judicial direction as established in Norton and Morrison
tends towards the expansion of due process protections for homosexuals,
it has not been unqualifiedly accepted. Recently, the United States
Court of Claims rendered a decision incorporating much of the rea-
soning found objectionable in Norton and Morrison.
In Schlegel v. United States,65 the Court of Claims held that the
plaintiff was properly discharged from his position because of his par-
ticipation in private homosexual activities. Despite Norton's objections
to the making or enforcing of absolute moral judgments, the Schlegel
court, after having allegedly distinguished its own case from the former
on the facts, issued the following declaration:
Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, in-
decent, lewd, and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious
that this is true. If activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced
in a government department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of
the service will in time be adversely affected. 66
This pronouncement is of no more legal significance than the similar
previously quoted statements of the Morrison dissent. Nevertheless, the
Court of Claims distinguished Norton on the ground that the former
decision involved only a minor infraction, whereas Schlegel was con-
cerned with more reprehensible activities.
In the concurring opinions of Judges Davis and Nichols, it was cor-
rectly noted that the Schlegel majority misconstrued the main thrust
of the District of Columbia Circuit's argument in Norton. Judge
Nichols recognized that the Norton court might well have reached an
identical determination had Norton's conduct been as acrimonious as
Schlegel's. In justifying the court's holding, both concurring opinions
relied on testimony indicating that Schlegel's retention would adversely
63 "Approximately one year after the [homosexual] . . . incident, Schneringer
[Morrison's partner therein] reported it to the Superintendent of the Lowell Joint School
District." 1 Cal. 3d at 219, 461 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
64 S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 267 (1943).
65416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
66 416 F.2d at 1378.
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affect efficiency, and upon the fact that his position required a "top
secret" security clearance. While Norton recognized that the potential
vulnerability of a homosexual to blackmail might result in a determina-
tion of unfitness for a security clearance,6r it also maintained that an
agency cannot support a dismissal merely on the basis that the individ-
ual's retention might cause "a general tarnishing of... [its] antiseptic
public image."'68 This view is specifically at variance with that enter-
tamined by Judge Nichols. "An agency," he said, "is not necessarily wrong
if it deems that good public relations favor efficiency, and that bad ones
detract from it."69 Hence, whereas Judge Nichols abstained from the
imposition of an absolute moral standard, in contrast to the dogmatic
approach of the Schlegel majority/ he strongly disagreed with Norton
in terms of the criteria to be used in determining whether or not an
employee's discharge would promote efficiency.
Had the Court of Claims limited its holding to the security prob-
lem in Schlegel, as specifically recognized in Norton, the latter decision
could have been readily distinguished. As to the majority's allegation
that homosexual activities between consenting adults inevitably lead
to a decrease in efficiency, it need only be stated that a dismissal resting
solely upon an assumption having no empirical support must fall for
arbitrariness under the fourteenth amendment. Similarly, the "embar-
rassment," or in deference to Judge Nichols, "good public relations" 7'
doctrine, is not significantly different from an unsupported determina-
tion of immoral conduct. Stated succinctly, this theory presumes that
if a homosexual is discharged, the public image of the agency will be
improved, thereby promoting efficiency. Perhaps the most obvious
fallacy in this reasoning is that, in the instance of a discreet individual,
the public would not become aware of his deviant sexual behavior if
not for the attempt to dismiss him. As noted in both Morrison and
Norton, however, if the individual's conduct is flagrantly displayed,
67 The fact that such vulnerability is caused by legislative and governmental attitudes
towards homosexuals is often conveniently forgotten. If not for the fear that he might
be criminally punished or dismissed from his job as a result of exposure, the homosexual's
susceptibility to blackmail would be negligible.
68417 F.2d at 1168.
69 16 F.2d at 1388.
70 The difference however, might be more correctly interpreted as a matter of degree.
Although Judge Nichols refrained from applying labels such as "indecent, lewd, and ob-
scene" to the plaintiff, he nevertheless referred to "the numberless other cases involving
homosexuals that stain the pages of our reports." Id. at 1582 (emphasis added). He also
felt quite convinced that the public would regard Schlegel's behavior "as scandalous and
disgraceful." Id. at 1383. Whatever the public's attitude towards the plaintiff's private
conduct, that of Judge Nichols is abundantly dear- irrespective of any resultant de-
crease in the adequacy of service.
71 Id. at 1382.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
i.e., if homosexual advances are committed during the course of em-
ployment, his conduct might well hinder performance. The same rea-
soning properly applies to a heterosexual employee who appears unable
to control his sexual desires during the working day. However, the
beliefs that homosexuals are less able to control their sexual drives
than are heterosexuals, and that male homosexuals are immediately
recognizable to their fellow employees and the general public as a result
of their allegedly effeminate mannerisms, are equally invalid assump-
tions.7 2
Although it is conceded that the presence of a known homosexual
may have an adverse effect upon efficiency, specific evidence must be
presented to show that this condition exists. A dismissal based on public
disapproval of an individual's status as a homosexual, 73 absent acts evi-
dencing a negative consequence on agency efficiency is violative of the
government's obligation to accord due process of law. Testimony such
as that upon which the Schlegel court so extensively relied does not
fulfill this obligation. The witnesses therein no more than endorsed the
Government's allegation that the plaintiff's presence decreased efficiency
by reason of the public's disdain of homosexuals. Their attestations
were totally devoid of any evidentiary basis and consequently were
nothing more than unsubstantiated opinion. The employee's right to be
confronted with an adequate rational cause for his removal cannot be
satisfied by mere conjecture simply because the source of speculation is
a bona fide witness.
In December of 1969, the District of Columbia Circuit was again
faced with many of the previously discussed considerations in Adams v.
Laird.74 The appellant therein had been employed for eight years by a
private company engaged in defense work. Thereafter, he was denied
security clearance because of his alleged involvement in homosexual
activities, and sought injunctive relief requiring the Secretary of De-
fense to accord him security authorizations which were a prerequisite
to his continued employment.
After finding that the appellant was a practicing homosexual, the
court, per Judge McGowan, determined that "[t]he potential for
instability and vulnerability to external pressure implicit in this du-
72 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372
(Ct. Cl. 1969); Pomeroy, Homosexuality, in THE SAME SEX 3, 10-11 (R. Weltge ed. 1969).
73 Crimes of status were invalidated in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
wherein the Court held that a statute prescribing a criminal penalty for the condition
of being addicted to a drug was repugnant to the eighth amendment.
74 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
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ality" 75 was sufficient basis for denying clearance to Adams as inconsis-
tent with the national interest. While Norton did suggest the possibility
of problems regarding security clearances for homosexuals employed in
secret projects, implicit in that opinion was the requirement that some
concrete evidence be adduced indicating the unfitness for such clear-
ance. Recognizing this, Judge Wright, dissenting, made the following
observations; hopefully, future adjudications will take note.
Generalized assumptions that all homosexuals are security risks
certainly cannot outweigh almost eight years of faithful service. ...
[T]he due process clause of the Fifth Amendment encompasses the
"right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable government interference." 76 As
a result of the Board's actions, appellant's ability to obtain em-
ployment in his profession is at least seriously impaired .... As-
sumptions predicated on appellant's unfortunate affliction un-
related to the facts of this case cannot provide a legal basis for
effectively denying him access to his livelihood .... [T]he Board de-
nied the clearance partially because appellant's homosexual acts
indicated that he was not "reliable or trustworthy." But no rational
connection between isolated homosexual activity and reliability
is demonstrated by facts as distinguished from unsupported assump-
tions. If the Board has any evidence . . . that this appellant spe-
cifically, or that homosexuals taken as a group, are not trustworthy
or reliable, it ought to include that evidence in this record.77
Judge Wright further stated that, whereas the Department of Defense
had concerned itself with the possibility that Adams would pose a
security risk, the Department was unable to point to a single breach in
appellant's eight years of handling classified information. The least the
appellant should be able to expect, he concluded, "is a decision in which
there is a rational nexus between the facts and the conclusions drawn
therefrom." 78
As recently as September 9, 1970, the United States District Court
for Minnesota rendered a decision embracing much of the reasoning
espoused by Judge Wright. In McConnell v. Anderson,9 the court
overturned a state university's refusal to hire an otherwise qualified
librarian on the basis of his admitted homosexuality. The university
argued that although the plaintiff might be competent professionally,
his self-proclaimed sexual preference for other males connotes to the
75 Id. at 239 n.7.
76 Id. at 241 (dissenting opinion).
77 Id., quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
78 Id. at 242.
79- F. Supp. - (D. Minn. 1970).
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public that he practices sodomous and criminal activities, and that
criminal behavior by university employees cannot be condoned. In
answer, the district court stated that since no evidence was produced
tending to establish the plaintiff's participation in criminal activities,
the university's position was based on mere speculation. A distinction
was then drawn between a person's status as a homosexual, and the
commission of homosexual criminal acts. "[I]n the absence of proof
and not mere surmise that he has committed or will commit criminal
acts or that his employment efficiency is impaired by his homosexuality
... ," reasoned the court, the refusal to hire the plaintiff would consti-
tute "a deprivation of liberty and property under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 0
While the immediate consequences of Norton, Morrison and
McConnell - i.e., vastly increased, if not unqualified, employment op-
portunities for homosexuals-are notable, the ramifications presaged
by these developments may be of more radical import. Although none
of these cases went so far as to abolish the criminal sanctions now
imposed on private, consensual homosexual activity, the due process
questions raised regarding the arbitrariness of the civil penalties are at
least arguably applicable to penal provisions as well. Just as the impair-
ment of agency efficiency must be evidenced in order to exclude homo-
sexuals from government employment, some demonstrably inimical
effect on society must be evidenced in order to outlaw nonconforming
moral codes.
This standard was recently implemented in Stanley v. Georgia,8'
where the United States Supreme Court indicated that the absence of
empirical evidence of such an inimical effect rendered unconstitutional
the proscription against private possession of "immoral," obscene
materials. And, the Second Circuit, in interpreting Stanley, has further
verbalized the sacred nature of the individual's right to private moral
development by stating that
[t]he most fundamental premise in our constitutional scheme may
be that every adult bears the freedom to nurture or neglect his
own moral ... growth. In a democracy one is free to work out one's
own salvation in one's own way .... If the only reason for a prose-
cution is to protect an adult against his own moral standards which
do harm to no one else, it cannot be tolerated.82
Since, as Norton indicated, the majority's disdain for homosexu-
SO ld. at -.
Si 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
82 United States v. Dellapia, - F.2d -, - (2d Cir. 1970).
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ality is of little consequence when weighed against the due process rights
of the individual, criminal sanctions must, in the future, rest solely
upon sufficient empirical evidence of an inimical effect on society. Given
the lack of such negative evidence, proscriptions against consensual
adult homosexual activity are unjustified; and, in fact, proponents of
such legislation must overcome much empirical evidence to the con-
trary.8
In contrast to the assertion that homosexuality has been contrary
to the social mores of most people "since antiquity, '8 4 sociological
research indicates that individuals attracted to members of their own
sex have been in evidence throughout history.85 It has also been found
that some form of homosexual conduct is acceptable to the majority of
human societies, and that in the United States, although "[t]he basic
mammalian capacity for sexual inversion tends to be obscured . . .
homosexual behavior is more common than the cultural ideals and
rules seem to indicate."8 6 Professor Alfred C. Kinsey reported that "at
least 37 per cent of the male population has some homosexual experi-
ence [to the point of orgasm] between the beginning of adolescence
and old age."87
Psychoanalytically, the presence of homosexuals can be explained
by Freud's theory of bisexuality. He maintained that unconscious
homosexuality is an important ingredient in basic personality struc-
ture, which may become dominant if there occurs an interference of
normal sexual development.88 "Latent homosexuality apparently exists
in everyone, although perhaps the amount varies from one person to
83 Many modern legal thinkers feel such laws actually prevent many individuals from
leading otherwise normal, socially productive lives. See, e.g., H.LA. HART, Lw, LIBERTY
AND MonALrrY 45-52 (1963); E. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SOCIEry 192-94, 205-07 (1969); Cantor,
The Need for Homosexual Law Reform, in THE SAmm SEx 83 (R. Weltge ed. 1969).
84 1 Cal. 3d at 243, 461 P.2d at 397, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (dissenting opinion).
85 C. FoRD & F. BEACH, PATrERNs oF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 125 (1952).
s6 Id. at 143.
87 A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY 8, C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEsAvio IN Ta HUAMAN MALE 665
(1948). The prevalence of homosexuals in the United States despite the intolerance of
society is further evidence of the unreasonableness of the present governmental attitude
towards these individuals. No evidence has been found supporting the contention that a
liberalization of the present policy would lead to an increase in overt homosexual be-
havior. The argument that a known homosexual teacher might cause his young students
to emulate his behavior is also without support. Moreover, this view must be carefully
weighed against the effect on the student who has engaged in homosexual activities, or
who has experienced homosexual desires. The psychological welfare of such a pupil who
hears himself described as a subhuman degenerate must be carefully considered before
societal bigotry is propagated by government.
88 Thompson, Changing Concepts of Homosexuality in Psychoanalysis, 10 PSYCHIATRY
183 (1947).
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another."8 9 In Freud's view, the persecution of homosexuals is a great
injustice.90
In accord with the recommendations of the British Wolfenden
Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, which deter-
mined that "there must remain a realm of private morality and im-
morality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business," 91
Parliament no longer proscribes private, consensual homosexual be-
havior. While the Committee recognized that the laws of any society
should be acceptable to the general moral sense of the community, it
felt no obligation to "enter into matters of private moral conduct
except insofar as they directly affect the public good." 92
In a similar vein, the American Law Institute made the following
observation: "No harm to the secular interest of the community is
involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult
partners. This area of private morals is the distinctive concern of
spiritual authorities." 93 Unless American legislators have contrary
evidence, which has heretofore been withheld from public scrutiny, it
would seem incumbent upon them to follow the example of their
British counterparts.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the absence of a legitimate public purpose in punishing
private homosexual behavior between consenting adults is the para-
mount reason underlying the need to liberalize present policy. It has
long been recognized that the means employed to effectuate an existent
purpose must be "reasonably necessary for [its] ... accomplishment...
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." 94 Ostensibly, legislation
enacted to further the efficacy of state-controlled educational institu-
tions or governmental agencies is not unwarranted. But the need to
enforce moral standards to accomplish this end must be substantiated
in order to meet the test of reasonableness. Statutes authorizing state
action on the basis of private immorality cannot fulfill this require-
ment unless their application can be shown to further proper legisla-
tive intent. Under any other circumstances the enforcement of such
89 Id.
90 A Letter From Freud, 107 Am. J. PsYcHcmTRY 786-87 (1951).
91 Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, CMD. No.
247, at 81 (1957).
92 Id. at 12.
93 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207, Comment 277-78 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
94 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 183, 137 (1894).
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provisions would be blatantly violative of the constitutionally protected
right of privacy. 95
Moreover, the societal propensity to condemn unconventional
behavior cannot serve as the basis for governmental interference with
private conduct, especially when weighed against the harsh results
thereby imposed upon the individual. The acceptance of the argument
that harm can properly be found existent on the basis of public "dis-
tress occasioned by the bare thought that others are offending in
private against [sexual] morality.., is too slight to outweigh the great
misery caused by [the enforcement of remedial legislation]."9' 6 Even if
action in the public behalf can be reasonably based on a proper legis-
lative intent, the means to this end cannot be "unduly oppressive."97
The revocation of an individual's right to practice the profession
of his choice is an extreme hardship. Although, to date, private homo-
sexual acts are proscribed by law, this conduct can almost always be
well integrated with an otherwise conforming way of life. The factual
situations in Morrison, Norton and, indeed, Schlegel, support this con-
clusion. The result of legal action revoking a homosexual's right to
pursue his chosen career must inevitably be a diminished desire to
conform to an otherwise socially acceptable life style. State and fed-
eral policies authorizing such action help to establish the pernicious
attitude of private employers and private citizens generally. Govern-
ment dismissal of homosexual employees because of public intolerance
cannot help but support the fallacious supposition that these indi-
viduals are incapable of leading socially productive lives. 98
95 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US.
479 (1965).
96 HART, supra note 83, at 46.
97 152 U.S. at 137.
98 See Sc uR, supra note 83, at 205-07 (1969); see also HART and Cantor, supra note 83.
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